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TO SHARE OR NOT TO SHARE: THE
INADVERTENT REACH OF THE NEW ESTATE
FREEZE STATUTES
I. INTRODUCTION
The transfer of family wealth is an underlying theme in Shakespeare's play,
Hamlet.' After Hamlet's father met an unexpected death in the garden, his
father's estate, the entire country of Denmark, passed to Hamlet's mother.
Perhaps, since there is no mention of an estate tax, this was an early version of
the unlimited marital deduction.2
When Hamlet's mother decided to marry Hamlet's deceased father's
brother, Hamlet saw his position as chief executive officer of Denmark snatched
away. Needless to say, Hamlet was distraught. In fact, he believed that he had
seen his deceased father walking the towers and speaking to him. In order to
maintain his sanity, Hamlet looked deep within his soul and reduced his
problem: "to be or not to be, that is the question."' Interestingly, if Hamlet
had been a scholar of Chapter 14 of the Internal Revenue Code, 4 he may have
rephrased his dilemma: "to share or not to share in the growth or profits of the
business, that is the question."
Section 2701 of Chapter 141 establishes the estate and gift tax
consequences6 of a transfer of all or part of a business from a parent to the next
1. WILIJAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK (John D. Wilson
ed., Cambridge University Press 1948) (1605).
2. I.R.C. § 2056 (West Supp. 1992). Essentially, § 2056 allows transfers of assets between
spouses without any gift or estate transfer taxes. This makes the husband and wife one economic
unit for transfer tax purposes.
3. SHAKEsPEARE, supra note 1, at 60.
4. I.R.C. § 2036(c) was repealed retroactively to transfers after December 17, 1987 by the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11601, 104 Stat. 1383 and was
replaced with Chapter 14 of the Internal Revenue Code, which included I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704 (West
Supp. 1992). All transactions that occurred between December 17, 1987 and October 8, 1990 will
be treated under the law as it existed prior to § 2036(c). Id.
5. See supra note 4.
6. I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2501 (West Supp. 1992). A federal gift tax is imposed on transfers by gift
during life, and the federal estate tax is imposed on the taxable estate at death. The estate tax and
the gift tax are unified so that a single progressive rate schedule is applied to an individual's lifetime
and death transfers. The unified transfer tax rates, which currently reach a top rate of 55%,
encourage the use of estate planning techniques to reduce the estate taxes and to preserve wealth
within a family unit. One widely used approach attempts to minimize the transfer tax value of
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generation. However, section 27017 is so broad that many routine transactions,
such as the redemption of a corporation's stock, the formation of a new
business,' or transactions between a parent and a child that utilize debt rather
than equity--if the debt is recharacterized as equity--may find themselves
ensnared within the scope of section 2701. Section 2701 treats these
transactions as preferred stock recapitalizations.'0 Thus, transactions falling
within the sweep of section 2701 result in unexpected gift or estate taxes."
The broad1 2 and inadvertent 3 impact of these statutes must therefore, be
understood not just from an estate planning standpoint, but also from a general
business planning perspective.
Recapitalization 4 of a corporation was a method commonly used by
parents to transfer their business to their children while allowing the parents to
maintain some degree of control over the business. Until 1987, recapitalization
was a popular technique.'" The parent recapitalized the business into common
stock 6 and preferred stock 7 and then exchanged the old common stock for
certain assets, which are typically business interests, by shifting the future appreciation in the value
of those assets to the owner's descendants and other family members.
7. See supra note 6. This note will deal primarily with § 2701. See infra note 100 (providing
a brief discussion of §§ 2702, 2703 and 2704).
8. See infra notes 218-48 and accompanying text (discussing certain common business
transactions covered by § 2701).
9. For example, when a parent lends money to a new corporation that is owned by his child,
the loan could be recharacterized as equity by the Internal Revenue Service [hereinafter IRS]
(discussed infra at notes 241-48 and accompanying text). The transaction now falls within the scope
of § 2701 because the parent has made a taxable gift to his child.
10. See Appendix A (describing a typical recapitalization). For further discussion of
recapitalizations, see infra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
11. See supra note 6.
12. See infra notes 218-48 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 218-48 and accompanying text.
14. See supra note 10; see also I.R.C. § 368 (West Supp. 1992) (defining various corporate
reorganizations).
15. In 1987, Congress passed I.R.C. § 2036(c) (1988), which required that the transferred
interest be included and taxed in a decedent's estate if the transferred interest represented a
disproportionate share of the potential appreciation (i.e. common stock) of an enterprise while
retaining an income interest (i.e. preferred stock). Thus, § 2036(c) disregarded the recapitalization
and taxed the decedent as if the transaction had never occurred. Id.
16. The United States Supreme Court, in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837 (1975), identified the characteristics usually associated with common stock as () the right
to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits, (ii) negotiability, (iii) the ability
to be pledged or hypothecated, (iv) the conferral of voting rights in proportion to the number of
shares owned, and (v) the capacity to increase in value. Id. at 847-57.
17. Preferred stock is defined as shares that are entitled to a specified dividend or liquidation
distribution before any payments can be made to common shareholders. See infra notes 59-60 and
accompanying text. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 253-57 (3d ed. 1986) for a
discussion of preferred stock attributes. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
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the preferred stock and gifted the new common stock to the children. The value
attributed to the preferred stock represented a significant portion of the value of
the entire business; the parent, as the preferred shareholder, retained voting
control of the business. The common stock represented only a small portion of
the value of the business and provided little if any voting control to the holder
of the common stock. For estate tax purposes, this corporate recapitalization
froze the value of the corporation in the preferred stock owned by the parent.
Any future increase in the value of the business was attributable to the common
stock now owned by the children. The future increase in the value of the
business escaped transfer tax."' This transaction was commonly referred to as
an estate freeze. 9
Congress perceived abuses in the use of the estate freeze technique.'
Because of the difficulties involved in accurately valuing corporate securities2'
that are not publicly traded, the estate freeze does lend itself to abuses. In 1987,
in response to those perceived abuses, Congress passed section 2036(c) that
effectively eliminated estate freezes.." The business community viewed the
18. See supra note 6.
19. Estate of Boykinv. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 345 (1987), illustrates the effect and
operation of a corporate recapitalization. In Boykin, the decedent owned 7,000 shares of the stock
of a land and timber company. His brother and other family members owned the remaining shares.
In 1969, the corporation was recapitalized, and each of the stockholders received a proportionate
number of shares of nonvoting preferred stock to go with their voting common stock. The
nonvoting stock had a preference in liquidation of up to $100 per share, before anything could be
paid to the common stockholders, and a right to receive 10 times the dividends per share paid to the
common stockholders. Each of the shareholders then executed trusts for their children and
descendants, and assigned their voting common stock to the trusts. When Mr. Boykin died, the IRS
contended that his control of the corporation through the dividend and liquidation preferences
constituted a retained right to control the beneficial enjoyment of the stock held by his descendants'
trusts. The IRS assessed a deficiency of $5,496,674, but the Tax Court disagreed. Id. at 345-47.
The court held that the voting common stock and the nonvoting preferred stock were separate classes
of corporate stock, and the mere retention of one class of stock did not "taint" or affect the
enjoyment of the other class. Id. at 348-49. See generally Propsra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248
(9th Cir. 1982); Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981); Estate of
Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193 (1990); Ward v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 78 (1986);
Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 938 (1982).
20. The Boykin case appears to have been quite important in prompting Congress' attempt to
curtail estate freezes by enactment of § 2036(c). See H. R. REP. No. 391, 100th Cong., Ist Sess.
1044 (1987) reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-660, which discusses the perceived abuses that
led to the enactment of § 2036(c). See infra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
21. A high value placed on the retained preferred stock and a low value placed on the gifted
common stock will lead to a disproportionate amount of any future appreciation in the business to
escape transfer tax. For a discussion of valuation factors and struggles with the valuation issue, see
infra note 153 and accompanying text.
22. See supra note 15.
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new statutes as unnecessarily complex and overreaching.' The estate planning
bar criticized section 2036(c) as an impediment to legitimate family
transactions.2 Furthermore, the 1990 Senate Report indicates that the Senate
was also concerned that section 2036(c) posed an unreasonable impediment to
the transfer of family businesses and that many taxpayers might refrain from
legitimate intrafamily transactiens because of its complex rules.' In response,
Congress repealed section 2036(c) and enacted section 2701 of the Internal
Revenue Code in October, 1990."
This Note advocates that a compelling need exists to better understand the
new mechanisms that must be utilized to pass small businesses from one
generation to the next, in order to avoid ensnaring innocent business transactions
that are not intended to bypass the transfer tax system. This Note will first
present a brief overview of estate and gift taxation as it applies to the transfer
of business interests." Second, this Note will examine the history and trends
in the taxation of business transfers from one generation to the next,' including
the evolution of case law and the congressional response to the case law.9
Third, this Note will explain the current statutes and treasury regulations
interpreting these statutes.' Fourth, this Note will examine the interplay of
debt, recharacterized as equity, on the new statutes and regulations.3 In
addition, it will identify several common business transactions that have been
ensnared by these statutes and regulations.32 Finally, this Note will advocate
revisions to section 2701 that would accomplish congressional objectives without
subjecting legitimate intrafamily business transactions to unwarranted
restrictions. 33
23. See Michael D. Mulligan, Estate Freeze Rules Eased By New Tax Law But Other
Restrictions Are Imposed, 18 EST. PLAN. 2 (1991).
24. Karen C. Burke, Valuation Freezes After the 1988 Act: The Impact of Section 2036(c) On
Closely Held Businesses, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 67, 69 (1989); (in particular, see footnote 10,
which discusses the American Bar Association's urging of Congress to repeal § 2036(c) because it
is overbroad, vague and ambiguous).
25. 101st Cong., 2d Sess., SENATE REPORT reprinted in 136 CONG. REC. S15679-81 (daily ed.
Oct. 18, 1990) (hereinafter SENATE REPORT).
26. See supra note 4.
27. See infra notes 34-54 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 55-73 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 74-98 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 99-185 and accompanyingtext.
31. See infra notes 186-217 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 218-51 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 252-69 and accompanying text.
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II. THE HISTORY OF ESTATE FREEZE TRANSACTIONS:
USES, ABUSES AND EVOLUTION
A. Overview of Estate and Gift Taxation of Business Interest Transfers
All estate freezing techniques adhere to two basic principles of taxation.
First, tax consequences follow, or attach to, the ownership of capital.'
Second, ownership and management of capital can be separated without adverse
tax consequences. 5 A parent should, therefore, be able to transfer non-voting
common stock' to a child and have the tax consequences of the common stock
flow to that child. Furthermore, the parent should be able to retain control with
preferred stock that has voting rights.37
Numerous statutes support the position that the individual or entity that
earns the income should be taxed on it.' The Supreme Court established this
doctrine" in its landmark decision, Lucas v. Earl.' In Lucas, the Supreme
Court taxed a husband on his earnings, even though he had agreed with his wife
that each would own one half of the other's earnings. The Court held that "the
statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax
could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however
skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second
in the man who earned it." 4' The Court also held that "no distinction can be
taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits
are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew."4 2 In other
words, the tax consequences follow the person who earns the income or owns
the capital that generates the income. Moreover, the taxpayer cannot artificially
attribute income to someone else. The courts have consistently upheld this
principle.43
34. DOUGLAS K. FREEMAN, ESTATETAX FREEZE: TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES §1.03 (1992). See
also Iucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); see infra note 40 and accompanying text.
35. FREEMAN, supra note 34, at § 1.03. See also United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125
(1972) infra note 44.
36. See supra note 16.
37. See supra note 17.
38. I.R.C. §§ 61, 267, 382, 704(e) (West Supp. 1992); I.R.C. § 269A (1988).
39. This doctrine is commonly referred to as the fruit of the tree doctrine. See infra note 40
and accompanying text.
40. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). The tax statutes and rates, at the time, provided for reduced taxes
to a husband and wife who had separate earnings and reported taxable income separately.
41. Id. at 114-15.
42. Id. at 115.
43. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (principle applied to assignment of investment
income); Johnson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 882 (1982) (principle applied to taxation of
shareholders instead of to the corporation); Carriage Square Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 119
(1977) (principle applied to allocation of partnership income).
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The courts have held that the ownership of capital and management of a
business can be separated without adverse tax consequences." In United States
v. Byrum," the court required that the retainedenjoyment or control must
relate directly to the transferred property.' Indirect control in the form of
retained voting stock did not trigger estate tax inclusion. 7 Thus, separating
ownership of capital and management simultaneously capped the value of the
business in the business owner's estate, and yet allowed the business owner to
retain control of the business.'
The federal transfer tax system taxes the value of property transferred by
a person during his life or upon his death.49 Therefore, minimizing the value
of the property is an essential element in an estate freeze transaction, since
decreasing the value of the property correspondingly reduces the transfer tax.
The value of business interests that are transferred by gift or included in the
decedent's gross estate is generally the business's fair market value at the time
of the gift or the date of death.-' Fair market value is the price at which the
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under the compulsion to buy nor sell and both having reasonable
knowledge of relevant facts.' This standard reflects the value of the property
to a hypothetical seller and buyer, not the actual parties to the transfer.52
Accordingly, courts have refused to consider familial relationships among co-
owners in valuing property. 3 In addition, a transfer that is made in the
ordinary course of business will be deemed to have been for full and adequate
consideration, and will not result in a gift.5'
44. United States v. Byrm, 408 U.S. 125, 150 (1972). The government contended that the
decedent continued to control corporate dividend policy and thus possessed the power to shift or to
defer beneficial enjoyment of income on the transferred stock. The Court rejected the government's
arguments largely because of the economic and legal constraints (fiduciary responsibilities) that are
imposed on a controlling shareholder's power. Id. at 144.
45. Id. at 150.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. This was a primary tenet of an estate freeze until 1987. In 1987, § 2036(c) and its
replacement, § 2701, statutorily overrode this principle.
49. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
50. I.R.C. § 2031(b) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031 (as amended in 1992) (providing guidelines
for the valuation of unlisted securities for estate tax purposes).
51. Tress. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965).
52. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237.
53. In Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981), the court allowed
corporate stock to be discounted (reduced) to reflect minority ownership in the block of stock being
valued even when the related persons together comprised a majority ownership in the underlying
stock. Id. at 1007.
54. The transaction must be a bona fide arm's length transaction and without any donative
intent. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (as amended in 1992).
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B. The Perceived Problem with Estate Freeze Recapitalizations
In the typical recapitalization,"' two or more classes of stock' are
created to separate the various rights represented by a share of stock. These
rights include the right to share in the earnings of the enterprise, the right to
share in the liquidation capital, the right to vote and assert control over the
management of the enterprise, and the right to future appreciation in the
enterprise.5" Preferred stock gives the holder a priority right to a fixed amount
of corporate earnings and liquidation capital and may also confer voting
rights.5' Common stock gives the holder a right to corporate earnings and
liquidation capital above the amounts assured to the preferred stockholders."
Common stock is sometimes accompanied by voting rights and always includes
the right to future appreciation in the corporation's net value.'
Estate freezing recapitalizations divide the two classes of stock between
members of different generations and allocate the different rights associated with
stock ownership."' For example, the older generation stockholders exchange
their common stock for preferred stock.' This exchange gives the older
generation a fixed dividend rate, a fixed redemption value, a preference on both
dividends and liquidation proceeds, and, in many cases, voting control.' 3 The
younger generation exchanges their common stock for a new class of common
stock or receives the common stock as a gift from the older generation. 6"
This transfer provides the younger generation shareholders with a subordinate
right to dividends and liquidation values, and the rights to all future appreciation
in the corporation.' The older generation retains control of the corporation
through its voting rights, while shifting the future appreciation of the corporation
55. See Appendix A (describing a typical recapitalization).
56. A partnership capital freeze operates in a similar conceptual manner, and therefore, will not
be separately described.
57. See generally ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 251-74 (3d ed. 1986) for a discussion
of common and preferred stock characteristics.
58. Id. at 253-57.
59. Id. at 252-53.
60. HOWARD M. ZARITSKY & RONALD D. AUCUTr, STRUCTURING ESTATE FREEzEs UNDER
CHAPTER 14, 5 (1991). See supra note 16 (discussing common stock characteristics identified by
the United States Supreme Court).
61. See Appendix A, which illustrates a typical estate freeze recapitalization based on ZARITSKY
& AUCUTr supra note 60, at 5-6.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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and growth in earnings to the younger generation."
Theoretically, the estate freeze described above and in Appendix A is not
innately abusive. 7 When the preferred and common stock are properly valued,
transfer taxes are not avoided.' A gift tax is imposed on the value of the new
common stock at the time of the transfer.' An estate tax is imposed on the
value of the preferred stock in the older generation shareholder's estate.' The
older generation shareholder could just as easily remove the future appreciation
from his estate by gifting the common stock and not retaining any preferred
stock."' By retaining the preferred stock, the older generation shareholder, in
effect, retains a degree of control over the value of the common stock
subsequent to the initial gift. 2 The retention of control over a gift of stock
arguably has value.
The potential for abuse in the preceding example arises from the possible
undervaluation of the common stock for gift tax purposes.' Estate of Boykin
v. Commissioner" illustrates a situation that is considered abusive according
to the Internal Revenue Service. At the time of the recapitalization, the
liquidation value of the preferred stock was $15,000,000, while the net worth
of the company was approximately $4,000,000. High liquidation value76 and
dividend preferences" were intended to offset a discount in the value of the
preferred stock because the preferred stock lacked cumulative dividend rights.'
66. Estate freeze recapitalizations, however, are not a panacea. The value of the corporation
could decrease in the future rather than increase. If the corporation is worth less at the older
generation shareholder's death, his estate may pay an artificially inflated estate tax based on the
frozen value of his preferred stock. The possibility that transfer taxes are artificially increased under
these circumstances seems to have been ignored by Congress in its members' discussions leading
to the statutory reform of estate freeze recapitalizations. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying
text. This author's research did not disclose any studies that indicate how often companies decrease
in value subsequent to an estate freeze recapitalization. The courts would not be asked to address
this situation because the Internal Revenue Service will not challenge an estate freeze that increases
the taxpayer's tax burden.
67. Burke, supra note 24, at 71.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Burke, supra note 24, at 71.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See infra note 167.
74. Burke, supra note 24, at 72.
75. 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 345 (1987).
76. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
78. Rights, attached to preferred stock such as a preference to other shareholders at the time
of liquidation, generally increase the value of the preferred stock. A preferred stock without the
right to cumulative dividends is generally worth less than a preferred stock with this right. See Rev.
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The government asserted that the company never intended to pay a market rate
of return on the preferred stock because the company actually paid only minimal
dividends." However, the Tax Court rejected the government's argument and
held that the voting common stock and the nonvoting preferred stock were
separate classes of stock, and that the mere retention of one class of stock did
not taint or affect the enjoyment of the other class of stock.' In effect, the
recapitalization in Boykin allowed the older generation shareholders to dispose
of the potential appreciation of the common stock at a minimal gift tax while
retaining control over the dividends that were actually paid on the preferred
stock. 8'
Congress began to view recapitalizations as deceptive methods of reducing
estate taxes' because recapitalizations artificially shifted future appreciation to
the next generation, while the present generation retained the income generated
by the corporation.s The House Ways and Means Committee, for example,
perceived that estate freeze recapitalizations were primarily substitutes for
testamentary dispositions that escaped substantial transfer taxes because of
undervaluation of the securities at the time of the transfer."' Another concern
was that the transferor effectively retained enjoyment of the entire enterprise"
by retaining a disproportionate share of the income or rights of the businesses.
In response to Boykins" and similar cases,87 Congress passed I.R.C.
Rul. 83-120, 1983-2 C.B. 170.
79. Boykin, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) at 347-48.
80. Id. at 348. The IRS also argued that Mr. Boykin's control of the corporation through the
dividend and liquidation preferences constituted a retained right to control the beneficial enjoyment
of the stock held by his descendant's trusts. Id.
81. Burke, supra note 24, at 78.
82. See ZARITSKY & AucUr, supra note 60, at 11 (presenting arguments for allowing the
traditional estate freeze recapitalization).
83. See H. R. REP. No. 391, 100th Cong., Ist Seas. 1044 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-660.
84. See H. R. REP. No. 795, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 422-423 (1988); see also S. REP. No. 445,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 526-27 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5028-29.
85. Id.
86. Estate of Boykin v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 345 (1987).
87. For example, in Snyder v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 529 (1989), Snyder created a personal
holding company to hold $2.5 million of marketable securities. The holding company issued both
common stock and two classes of preferred stock. The common stock was the only voting stock,
and it was empowered to force redemption of the preferred stock for its par value at any time.
Snyder gave the common stock to trusts for her great-grandchildren, retaining both classes of the
preferred stock. She valued the common stock at a nominal value, $1,000, contending that the
entire value of the company was reflected in the preferred stock. The IRS contended that the
common stock given to the trusts was worth $2,412,000. Id. at 535-38. The Tax Court agreed with
Snyder's appraisers, who had computed the value of the common stock by reducing the value of the
total corporation by the value of the preferred stock (the subtraction method). Id. at 545. The court
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section 2036(c) in 1987.' Section 2036(c) treated a transferor (older
generation shareholder) as having retained a transferred interest when he
transferred a disproportionately large share of stock with potential appreciation
and retained an interest in the income or rights of the entity." Therefore, the
transferred interest was included in the transferor's gross estate and subjected
to estate tax. Section 2036(c) required that the transferred interest be included
and taxed in a decedent's estate if the transferred interest represented a
disproportionate share of the potential appreciation (i.e., common stock) of an
enterprise while retaining an income interest (i.e.. preferred stock).' Thus,
section 2036(c) disregarded the estate freeze recapitalization and taxed the
decedent as if the transaction never occurred. 9'
The business community, however, viewed the new statutes as
unnecessarily complex and overreaching.' The estate planning bar criticized
section 2036(c) as an impediment to legitimate family transactions." The
Senate Committee Report indicates that the Senate was also concerned that
section 2036(c) posed an unreasonable impediment to the transfer of family
businesses and caused many taxpayers to refrain from legitimate intrafamily
transactions.' Furthermore, in 1990, when Congress repealed section
2036(c),9" it believed that the statute was an "inappropriate and unnecessary
approach to the valuation problems associated with estate freezes.""
In developing the replacement statutes, the Committee attempted to provide
a well-defined and administrable set of rules that would allow business owners
who were not abusing the transfer tax system to freely exchange business
interests in standard intrafamily transactions, without being subject to severe
transfer tax consequences.' Concurrently, the Committee also desired to
develop statutes that would deter abusive transactions that avoided transfer
taxes. 98
valued the preferred stock on the basis of its redemption price, because that is all any buyer could
be sure of obtaining for it on the date of the gift. Id. at 544-45.
88. See supra note 4.
89. See Burke, supra note 24, at 91.
90. ZARITSKY & AUcu'r, supra note 60, at 15.
91. Id.
92. Mulligan, supra note 23, at 2.
93. Burke, supra note 24, at 69.
94. SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at S15680.
95. See supra note 4.
96. SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at S15680.
97. Id.
98. Id. at S15681. Chapter 14 approaches the problem from a different perspective than §
2036(c), which it replaces. Rather than adopting an estate tax solution to the problem, the new
statutes adopt a gift-tax solution. Id.
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III. EXPLANATION OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 2701
A. Erplanation and Scope of Section 2701
To replace the repealed section 2036(c), Congress added Chapter 14 to the
Internal Revenue Code," thereby adding four new statutes, sections 2701-
2704.1"0 The new statutes focus on the value of the interes&"1 that are
actually retained by the transferor. Chapter 14 is primarily a valuation and gift
tax provision that deals with estate freeze transactions at the time of the initial
transfer. " If the retained interest does not satisfy certain requirements, the
retained interest is deemed to have no value.'"m Moreover, retention of a non-
qualified interest does not reduce the value of the transfer.'" This results in
a taxable gift of the entire property at the time of the estate freeze
99. See supra note 4.
100. This note focuses on § 2701. A brief outline of §§ 2702-2704 follows to add some
perspective as to how these statutes interrelate with § 2701. Section 2702 attempts to limit the use
of estate freezing transactions not related to corporations or partnerships, providing that the gift tax
value of certain remainder interests will be determined without regard to the intervening retained
term interest, thus eliminating or severely limiting the use of several traditional estate planning
techniques. Under § 2702, the value of a gift in a trust in which the transferor retains an interest
will be determined as if the retained interest had no value, unless the retained interest takes certain
special forms (an annuity, a unitrust interest, a remainder interest following one of these interests,
or an interest in certain trusts holding residences or nondepreciable tangible property).
Section 2703 addresses the use of buy-sell agreements and similar arrangements to freeze the
value of interests in family corporations and partnerships. Under § 2703 the value of a decedent's
interest in a corporation or partnership will be determined without regard to any option, agreements,
or other right to acquire or use the property at less than its fair market value, or any other restriction
on the sale or disposition of such property, unless two requirements (in addition to the traditional
requirements observed by the IRS and the courts) are met. First, the agreement must both have a
bona fide business purpose and not be a tax-avoidance device. Second, its terms must be
comparable to similar arrangements entered into by persons in arm's length transactions.
Section 2704 addresses specifically the problem raised in recent Tax Court decisions by
providing that a lapse of any voting or liquidation right created on or after October 9, 1990, in an
entity controlled by the holder's family constitutes a taxable gift, or an increase in the value of the
holder's gross estate if it occurs at death.
Finally, to aid the IRS in its auditing function with respect to transactions under Chapter 14,
§ 6501 (c)(9) provides that if a transfer results in a gift or an increase in gift tax value because of the
new rules of §§ 2701 and 2702, the usual three-year statute of limitations for gift tax purposes will
not begin to run with respect to that transfer until the transfer is adequately disclosed on a gift tax
return. In other words, it will not be enough to file a gift tax return reporting other gifts for that
year; specific reference must be made on the tax return to the § 2701 or § 2702 transaction.
101. Interests retained by the transferor are usually a type of preferred stock. See Estate of
Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193 (1990).
102. 1.R.C. § 2701 (West Supp. 1992); Tress. Reg. § 25.2701 (1992).
103. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(3) (West Supp. 1992).
104. See generally Mulligan, supra note 23, at 2.
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recapitalization. "o
At first reading, section 2701 is very difficult to understand because the
transactions that fall within its scope are not actually defined until the end of the
statute.'t° Furthermore, other definitions, which must be understood before
the statute can be properly interpreted, are interwoven throughout the
statute.107 Appendices B and C provide an overview of section 2701. In fact,
the reader may find it helpful to refer to the appendices at this time to obtain an
overall understanding of section 2701. Appendix B illustrates the various types
of transactions and equity interests to which section 2701 applies." s Appendix
C illustrates how section 2701 requires the interests to be valued. "0'
Section 2701(a) provides the general rule for determining whether a
transfer"' of a junior equity interest"' in a corporation or partnership," 2
105. If § 2701 applies, it requires a departure from traditional valuation theory. Specifically,
traditional valuation theory requires that the value be the amount at which a willing buyer will buy
and a willing seller will sell the interest, neither being under a compulsion to buy nor sell, and both
having knowledge of all relevant facts. See generally, Tress. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as amended in
1992); Tress. Reg. § 20.2031-2(f) (as amended in 1992); Rev. Rul. 83-120, 1983-2 C.B. 170
(amplifying Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237).
106. I.R.C. § 2701(e) (West Supp. 1992).
107. E.g. I.R.C. §§ 2701(a)(4)(B), 2701(c)(1)(A)(i), 2701(c)(l)(A)(ii), 2701(e)(1), and
2701(e)(2) (West Supp. 1992).
108. See infra notes 110-36 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 137-75 and accompanying text.
110. I.R.C. § 2701(e)(5) (West Supp. 1992), and Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-1(b) (1992), require
that there be a transfer of an interest in a corporation or partnership. The regulation states that a
transfer for this purpose can occur whether or not the transfer would otherwise be a taxable gift
under chapter 12 of the Internal Revenue Code. For example, § 2701 applies to a transfer for full
and adequate consideration where X sells his common stock to his son for its fair market value of
$1,000,000 but retains noncumulative preferred stock. A transfer includes a redemption,
recapitalization, or other change in the capital structure of a corporation or partnership if the
taxpayer or an applicable family member either receives an applicable retained interest or "under
regulations" holds such an interest immediately after the transaction. Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-1(b)
(1992) defines a transfer to include 1) a redemption, recapitalization, or other change in the capital
structure of the entity if the transferor or applicable family member, holding an applicable retained
interest, receives property other than such an interest or the value of the applicable retained interest
is increased (i.e. common stock received in recapitalization), or 2) a termination of an indirect
holding in an entity. See Tress. Reg. §§ 25.2701-1(a)(3), 25.2701-1(e) (1992) for illustrations.
11l. Section 2701(a)(4)(B)(i) defines a junior equity interest as common stock or, in the case
of a partnership, any partnership interest where the rights to income and capital are junior to the
rights of all other classes of equity interests. Section 2701 (a)(4)(B)(ii) defines an equity interest as
stock or any partnership interest.
112. I.R.C. §§ 7701(a)(2) and 7701(a)(3) (West Supp. 1992) define a partnership and a
corporation respectively. There is nothing in § 2701 or the regulations to suggest that these are not
the definitions to use. It appears that § 2701 would apply to an entity that is not formally organized
as a corporation. For attributes of an entity not formally organized as a corporation but taxed as a
corporation, see generally, Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935); Elm Street Realty
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controlled" 3 by the transferor, to a member of the transferor's family"" is
a gift; and--if so--determines the value of the gift."' The general rule is that
the value of certain rights"' attributable to any applicable retained interest""
held by the transferor or an applicable family member"' will be determined
as stipulated by section 2701(a)(3). Section 2701(a)(3) provides that (i) the
value of any such rights," 9 other than a distribution right'"' that consists of
Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 803 (1981); Hynes v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1266 (1980); and
Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976).
113. I.R.C. §§ 2701(b)(2) and 2701(e)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1992); Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-
2Qo)(5)(i) (1992). The regulations define a controlled entity covered by § 2701 as a corporation or
partnership controlled (at least 50% of the voting control) immediately before a transfer, by the
transferor, applicable family members, and any lineal descendants of the parents of the transferor
or the transferor's spouse. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-6 (1992) for discussion of indirect holding
of interests.
114. A member of the transferor's family is defined in I.R.C. § 2701(e)(1) (West Supp. 1992)
and Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-1(d)(1) (1992) as the transferor's spouse, a lineal descendant of the
transferor or the transferor's spouse, and the spouse of any such descendant. In order for § 2701
to apply, the junior equity interest must be transferred to the transferor's spouse or a lower
generation family member. A transfer to an ancestor of the transferor is outside the operation of
§ 2701.
115. See infra notes 137-75 and accompanying text.
116. See infra note 117 for discussion of various rights.
117. In the case of a controlled entity, an applicable retained interest is defined in I.R.C. §
2701(b)(1) (West Supp. 1992) and Tress. Reg. §25.2701-2 (b)(l) (1992) as a distribution right. An
extraordinary payment right is an applicable retained interest whether or not it was a controlled
entity. An extraordinary payment right is defined in I.R.C. § 2701(c)(2) (West Supp. 1992) and
Tress. Reg. 25.2701-2(b)(2) (1992) as any liquidation, put, call or conversion right (or similar
right), the exercise or nonexercise of which will affect the value of the transferred interest. It
excludes any right that must be exercised at a specific time and for a specific amount. It also
excludes any nonlapsing right to convert into a fixed number or percentage of the same class of
stock as the transferred interest.
118. An applicable family member is defined in I.R.C. § 2701(e)(2) (West Supp. 1992) and
Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-1(d)(2) (1992) as the transferor's spouse, any ancestor of the transferor or
the transferor's spouse, and the spouse of any such ancestor. The retained interest must, therefore,
be held by the transferor, the transferor's spouse, or senior generation family members in order for
the statute to apply.
119. See supra note 117 for discussion of various rights.
120. A distribution right is defined in I.R.C. § 2701(c)(1) (West Supp. 1992) and Tress. Reg.
25.2701-2 (b)(3) (1992) as the right to receive distributions with respect to an equity interest. The
following distributions are not considered distribution rights: 1) any right to receive distributions
with respect to an interest in the same class or a class subordinate to the transferred interest; 2) any
extraordinary payment right; 3) any right of a partner to receive guaranteed payments of a fixed
amount described in I.R.C. § 707(c) (1988); and 4) any mandatory payment right, liquidation
participation right or non-lapsing conversion right. The significance of these exclusions is that these
rights (not including extraordinary payment rights) are valued at fair market value outside of the
scope of § 2701. Note that a right to interest payments is not a distribution right. Section 2701 will
not apply if the transferor gives away common stock and retains only debt and common stock. See
infra notes 194-217 and accompanying text for a discussion of debt recharacterized by the courts as
equity. r
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a right to receive a qualified payment,' 2 ' shall be zero;'2 and (ii) if a right
to a qualified payment' " is combined with a liquidation, put, call, or
conversion right," then the value of all such extraordinary payment rights
shall be determined in a manner that results in the lowest value. 125
If the corporation does not make payments for four years,'12 section
2701(d) treats the transaction as if a gift" has been made by the transferor of
his and other family member's preferred stock. This "taxable event"" is the
earliest of the following: a lifetime transfer of the preferred stock; the death of
the owner of the preferred stock; or the time when the late dividends are paid
121. A qualified payment right is defined in I.R.C. § 2701 (c)(3) (West Supp. 1992), Tress.
Reg. § 25.2701-2(b)(6) (1992) and Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-4 (c)(3) (1992) as a dividend payable on
a periodic basis on a cumulative preferred stock (or comparable partnership interest) at a fixed rate
or a rate which bears a fixed relationship to a specified market rate. An election may be made to
treat a payment, which would qualify as a qualified payment, as not qualifying (an election out).
An election may be made to treat a payment that does not qualify as a qualified payment right (an
election in). The payment may not be in the form of an equity interest such as a stock dividend.
122. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1992).
123. See supra note 121 for a discussion of qualified payments.
124. Put, call, liquidation and conversion rights generally allow the holder of the right to either
acquire or dispose of the security at a predetermined price. See Hamilton, supra note 17.
125. In the event that a qualified payment right is combined with an extraordinary payment
right the value of these rights is determined under § 2701(a)(3) in such a manner as to result in the
lowest total value for all such rights. Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-2(a)(5) (1992) illustrates the rule:
P, an individual, holds all 1,000 shares of x Corporation's $1,000 par value preferred
stock bearing an annual cumulative dividend of $100 per share and holds all 1000 shares
of x's voting common stock. P has the right to put all the preferred stock to x at any
time for $900,000. P transfers the common stock to P's child and immediately
thereafter holds the preferred stock. Assume that at the time of the transfer, the fair
market of x is $1,500,000, and the fair market value of P's annual cumulative dividend
right is $1,000,000. Because P has both an extraordinary payment right (the put right)
and the qualified payment right (i.e., the right to receive cumulative dividends), the
special rule of paragraph (a)(3) of this section applies, and the value of these rights is
determined as if the put right will be exercised in a manner that results in the lowest
total value being determined for the rights (in this case, by assuming that the put will
be exercised immediately). The value of P's preferred stock is $900,000 (the lower of
$1,000,000 or $900,000). The amount of the gift is $600,000 ($1,500,000 minus
$900,000).
126. I.R.C. § 2701(d) (West Supp 1992); Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-4(1992).
127. The value of the deemed gift is the excess of (i) the value of qualified payments payable
during the period beginning on the date of transfer and ending on the date of the taxable event,
calculated as if all such payments were paid when due and reinvested at a yield equal to the discount
rate used in determining the value of the applicable retained interest, over (i) the value of such
payments actually paid during such period assuming the same reinvestment. I.R.C. § 2701 (d) (West
Supp. 1992); Treas. Reg. § 25.27014 (1992). The result of this approach is to compound unpaid
distributions in determining their value. Such compounding fails to take into account any income
taxes that would be payable on the dividends received, and therefore overstates the compound value.
128. I.R.C. § 2701(d) (West Supp. 1992); Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-4(b) (1992).
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and the taxpayer elects to treat the payment as a taxable event. 9
Section 2701 provides exceptions to certain transfers that, by their nature,
would not avoid transfer taxes. 3 For example, if market quotations are
readily available on an established securities market for the transferred
interest' 3l or the retained interest," section 2701 does not apply. In
addition, section 2701 does not apply if the retained interest is of the same class
of equity as the transferred interest; 3 for example, if both the retained and
the transferred interest are both common stock. When the retained interest is
of a class that is proportionally the same"3 as the class of the transferred
interest, 35 section 2701 does not apply. Finally, section 2701 does not apply
if the transfer results in a proportionate reduction of each class of equity interest
held by the transferor and all applicable family members in the aggregate
immediately before the transfer."
B. Valuation of Business Interests Under Section 2701
Once a determination is made that section 2701 applies to a transaction, the
valuation mechanics must be deciphered 117 The section 2701 regulations"'
clarify the Internal Revenue Service's interpretation of the valuation mechanics.
Appendix C illustrates the valuation' 9 process required by section 2701 and
129. I.R.C. § 2701(d) (West Supp. 1992); Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-4(b) (1992).
130. See infra notes 131-136.
131. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(1) (West Supp. 1992); Treas. Reg. §25.2701-1(c) (1992). The
transferred interest is usually common stock.
132. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1992); Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-1(c) (1992). The
retained interest is usually preferred stock.
133. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1992); Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-1(c) (1992).
134. This is determined without regard to nonlapsing differences in voting power. I.R.C. §
2701(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1992); Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-1(c) (1992).
135. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1992); Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-1(c) (1992).
136. This exception is not specifically provided for in the statute, but the regulations provide
for this exception. Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-1(c)(4) (1992).
137. Section 2701(a)(3) provides rules for valuing the retained interests. Section 2701(a)(4)
establishes a minimum value for the junior equity interest. However, the specific application of
these statutes with economic valuation principles is not addressed. Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-3 (1992)
provides some guidance in the mechanics of valuing the retained interests and the interplay with
economic valuation principles.
138. Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-3 (1992).
139. The values determined under § 2701 may not be the fair market value in terms of the
normal willing buyer and willing seller test (see infra note 153 and accompanying text). As a result,
the values determined under the section 2701 rules may not apply for basic purposes. I.R.C. § 1015
(1988) (relating the basis of property acquired by gift) and I.R.C. § 1014 (1988) (relating to property
acquired for a decedent) appear to be unaffected by § 2701. Section 2701 valuation rules apply for
purposes of determining whether there is a gift and the amount of the gift. Normal valuation rules
apply in determining fair market value for basis purposes.
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its regulations.
The Senate Report"s states that the rules for section 2701 rely on present
law valuation principles that use a subtraction method 4' in valuing transferred
interests, with an adjustment to reflect actual fragmented ownership.t"
However, the plain language of section 2701 does not refer to the subtraction
method of valuing the business. Furthermore, the Senate Report's reference to
the present legal principles that use the subtraction method is not entirely
clear. 43 Neither income tax nor transfer tax statutes refer to the subtraction
method of valuation.'"
The Tax Court does not appear to either endorse or refute the subtraction
method of valuation."4 In a 1989 decision, the Tax Court upheld the use of
the subtraction method in the valuation of a personal holding company.
However, in 1990, the same Tax Court specifically rejected the use of the
subtraction method in the estate tax valuations of publishing corporations, but
left open its use under different circumstances. 47 These two decisions"4
140. See generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 25.
141. The premise of the subtraction method is that all of the various interests being valued must
equal the value of the entire business. Conversely, from the value of the entire business, subtract
the value of the interest retained to determine the amount of the gift. From an economic perspective
the subtraction method may not be theoretically correct. For example, if 100 shareholders each own
one percent of a business that is not publicly traded, the value of each shareholders interest will be
reduced by minority and lack of marketability discounts. Therefore, the cumulative values of the
100 shareholders' interests would be worth less than the value of the business to one shareholder
owning 100%. The subtraction method is also discussed infra notes 146-149. Minority and
marketability discounts are discussed infra note 167.
142. See generally supra note 25.
143. See generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at S15681.
144. See saqpra note 141 and accompanying text for a discussion of the subtraction method of
valuation; see infra notes 146-149 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 146-147 and accompanying text.
146. Snyder v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 529 (1989).
147. The tax court states in Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193, 247 (1990):
Not only is there no support in the record for the subtraction method in this case, but
we conclude that it is far too simplistic a method for the valuation of the Advance
common stock. An underlying fallacy in this theory of valuation is the assumption that
the sum of the fair market values of the preferred stock and the common stock, each
sold independently to separate buyers, must equal the net value of the entire company
as a going concern. Massive amounts of credible evidence in this case indicate that this
assumption is not supportable.
If all the common and preferred stock in the company were sold at one time to a
single buyer, we have little doubt that the price would approach the values that the
experts on both sides determined for the business as a whole. But if either class of
stock is sold separately, a buyer cannot be reasonably certain of his ability to eliminate
or control the other shareholders, and the price will be less than its proportionate share
of the total value. Although the subtraction method may be suitable for other situations,
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 [1992], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol27/iss1/5
1992] TO SHARE OR NOT TO SHARE 195
appear to base the appropriateness of the use of the subtraction method on the
facts and circumstances of each case. Nevertheless, the present case law
governing the use of the subtraction method in valuing a business is
inconclusive.
The regulations" provide a four step methodology for the application of
the subtraction method in the context of a section 2701 valuation. The
regulations generally determine the amount of a gift by subtracting the values of
all family-held" equity interests that are senior 5' to the transferred
interest'52 from the value of the family-held interests'53 that are determined
its use is inappropriate for Advance.
Id.
148. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
149. Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-3 (1992). Since the courts do not provide clear guidance in the
application of the subtraction method, the regulations provide the only guidance in § 25.2701-3.
Congressional intent appears to be that it did not intend to change current valuation practices (see
SENATE REPORT, supra note 25). There could possibly be future litigation to determine whether the
regulation methodology prescribed to implement the subtraction method is representative of present
legal principles.
150. Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-3(a)(2)(i) (1992). Family-held means held, directly or indirectly,
held by an applicable family member and any lineal descendants of the parents of the transferor or
the transferor's spouse. Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-2(b)(5)(i) (1992).
151. This usually means preferred stock. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text
(discussing equity interests).
152. See Mulligan, supra note 23, at 2.
153. While there are numerous approaches available to the appraiser in the valuation of closely
held business interests, the value of the interest is generally a function of either its return or its claim
on the underlying assets of the entity. The value of an entity based on a function of its return is
usually expressed as a function of its earning capacity. The earnings are then capitalized at
appropriate risk-adjusted rates. This theory is based on the premise that the investment in the
closely held business will yield a return sufficient to recover the initial cost and compensate the
investor for the inherent risks of ownership. The capitalization rate is generally derived from an
analysis of various investment alternatives and the risk associated with these investments. In some
cases, the earnings are relatively insignificant in establishing the value of the entity. This situation
occurs where the earnings are low relative to the value of the underlying assets. For example, a
farmer operating an unprofitable farm on the edge of a growing city may have land worth far more
than the farm income it generates. In such cases, it is appropriate to value the entity based on the
value of the underlying assets.
Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237 sets forth the following factors to be considered in
determining fair market value:
1) the nature of the business and the history of the enterprise from its inception;
2) the economic outlook in general and the condition and outlook of the specific industry
in particular;
3) the book value of the stock and the financial condition of the business;
4) the earning capacity of the company;
5) the dividend-paying capacity of the company;
6) Whether or not the enterprise has goodwill or other intangible value; and the market
price of corporations engaged in the same or similar line of business having their shares
actively traded in a free and open market, either on a national exchange or over the
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immediately before the transfer. Then, the balance is allocated among the
transferred interests and other interests of the same class and subordinate
classes."'
The balance that is allocated among the transferred interests is the amount
of the gift. The value of the retained interest is, therefore, kept low," while
the corresponding value of the transferred interest is kept high. Thus, section
2701 prevents taxpayers from abusing the valuation process by making certain
that the retained interest is valued as low as possible so that the transferred
interest is valued as high as possible." 6
The following is a summary of the four-step valuation process that is
required under the regulations:'"5
Step One: Determine the fair market value of the family-held equity
interests in the entity immediately after the transfer under the normal valuation
methodology." The fair market value is determined by assuming that the
family-held interests 59 are held by one individual.)"
Step Two: Subtract the value of the senior equity interest 6' from the
value determined in step one. This is a two step process. First, from the value
determined in step one, subtract the fair market value"6 of all senior equity
counter.
Revenue Ruling 59-60 also discusses the selection of capitalization rates and the process of
reconciling various indications of value. See generally, Tress. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as amended in
1981); Tress. Reg. § 20.2031-2(0 (as amended in 1974); Rev. Rul. 83-120, 1983-2 C.B. 170,
(amplifyng Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237); Estate of Newhousev. Commissioner, 94T.C. 193,
247 (1990); SHANNON PRATr, VALUING A BUSINESS (1981).
154. Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-3 (a) (1992).
155. See infra notes 176-85 and accompanying text for an example of this application.
156. A valuation of the transferred interest based on generally accepted valuation methods
which would reflect the value based on financial and economic considerations, and not on tax
considerations, could yield a lower value. The result is that the transferor is paying a higher transfer
(gift) tax. See supra note 153 for a discussion of business valuation methodology.
157. Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-3 (b) (1992).
158. Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-3(b)(1) (1992); See supra note 153 for discussion of normal
valuation methodology.
159. See supra note 150 for the definition of family-held interests.
160. Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-3(b)(1) (1992). Since fair market value is determined as if one
person holds all of the stock interests, no minority or other discounts are allowed for fragmented
ownership.
161. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1992).
162. Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-3(b)(2)(A) (1992). The fair market value of an interest is its pro
rats share of the fair market value of all family-held senior equity interests of the same class. Fair
market value of senior equity interests (usually preferred stock) is based on economic valuation
methods, rather than section 2701.
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interests,"6 other than the applicable retained interests, that are held by the
transferor or applicable family members. Next, subtract the value of all
applicable retained interests'" that were not subtracted in the first part of step
two. 65
Step Three: Allocate the remaining value among the transferred interests
and other family-held subordinate equity interests.' 6
Step Four: Reduce the amount determined in step three by any minority
discounts" or other similar discounts" in addition to any proceeds that
were received by the transferor.'"
Congress, however, failed to completely address the valuation issues in
section 2701. Clearly, valuation is the area in which Congress perceived the
abuses that led to the enactment of the original restrictions of estate freeze
recapitalizations."' ° However, because it failed to specifically address the
163. Rev. Rul. 83-120, 1983-2 C.B. 170, provides guidelines for valuing preferred stock
(senior equity interest). These factors include the entity's dividend paying capacity, dividend paying
intent, and adequacy of the stated dividend rate based on a risk-retur comparison with high-grade
publicly traded preferred stock.
164. In general, the value of these rights in the hands of the transferor or applicable family
member is zero, except for distribution rights (see supra note 120) that are qualified payments.
Qualified payment rights are valued as preferred stock. See supra note 121.
165. Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-3(b)(2) (1992).
166. Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-3(b)(3) (1992).
167. Fragmented ownership is commonly referred to as a minority interest. A minority
shareholder does not have the power to change by-laws, force a liquidation, determine salaries or
dividend policies, or affect any other significant corporate policy. A discount from the value of the
entity as a whole is appropriate. PRArr, supra note 153, at 74-76. In Cravens v. Welch, 10
F.Supp. 94 (D. Cal. 1935), the court stated that "minority stock interests in a closed corporation are
usually worth much less than the proportionate share of the assets to which they attach." Id. at 95.
The Internal Revenue Service has continuously taken the position that minority discounts do not
apply in family business situations. Rev. Rul. 81-253, 1981-2 CB 187. The courts have
consistently upheld minority discounts in family businesses. See e.g. Propstra v. United States, 680
F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982); Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981); Ward
v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 78 (1986); Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 938 (1982).
For the purposes of applying a minority discount, the family-held interests of the same class are
treated as one shareholder. Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-3(b)(4)(ii)(A) (1992). Rev. Rul. 77-287, 1977-2
C.B. 319 sets forth the factors to consider in determining the magnitude of the discount.
Minority discounts are applied to reflect that an interest that has control of a business is more
valuable than a minority interest that has little or no control. By treating all family-held interests
as a single shareholder the regulations take the position that the minority discount should be applied
in step 4. See also the court's discussion of minority discounts in Central Trust Co. v. United
States, 305 F.2d 393, 405 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
168. See PRATr, supra note 153, at 74-76.
169. Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-3(b)(4) (1992).
170. See supra notes 19-20.
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application of the subtraction method of valuation which was mentioned in the
Senate Committee Report,' 7 ' and because of its treatment of fragmented
ownership, Congress has again left the taxpayer unsure of the consequences of
an estate freeze recapitalization.
C. Minimum Value Rule
Section 2701 establishes a minimum value rule that applies to transfers that
are subject to section 2701.11 Under this rule, the aggregate value of all
junior equity interests'" in the entity cannot be less than ten percent of the
sum of 1) the value of all equity interests in the entity, and 2) all
indebtedness74 of the entity that is owed to the transferor or an applicable
family member. If dividends related to qualified payment rights are left unpaid,
the general rule requires an increase in the taxable estate of a decedent-
transferor who holds property with cumulative, but unpaid, dividends at death.
The taxable gifts of a transferor who makes a lifetime transfer of such property
are likewise increased."5
D. Valuation Example
The following example, as adapted from the regulations, 76 illustrates the
subtraction method both with and without the valuation adjustment.
Example: Corporation X has outstanding:
1) 1,000 shares of $1,000 par value 8% cumulative voting preferred stock,
each share of which carried a right to put' 7 the stock to Corporation X for par
value at any time, and
2) 1,000 shares of nonvoting common stock.
Suppose that A owned 60 % of the preferred stock and 75 % of the common
stock. The balance of the stock was held by B, a person unrelated to A. The
fair market value of each share of preferred stock (without regard to section
171. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at S15681.
172. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1992); Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-3(c) (1992).
173. See supra note 111 and accompanying text for a discussion of junior equity interests.
174. Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-3(c)(2)(1992) excludes from the definition of indebtedness: 1) short
term debt incurred with respect to the current conduct of the business, and 2) a lease payment
representing fill and adequate consideration for use of the property.
175. I.R.C. § 2701(d) (West Supp. 1992) and Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-4 (1992) deal with the
specific mechanics of applying this adjustment.
176. Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-3(d) (1992).
177. See supra note 124 for a discussion of puts.
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2701) was $1,000. A's put right" is an extraordinary payment right'" that
is valued at zero. Assume that A's cumulative dividend right," which is a
qualified payment right,"" is valued"s at $800 per share. Subsequently, A
transferred all of his common stock to his child. The method to use in valuing
A's gift is as follows:
Step One: Assume the fair market value of all of A's family-held interests
is $1,000,000.18
Step Two: From the $1,000,000 value determined in step one, subtract
$4 80 ,000 ."' Thus, the aggregate value of the common stock is $520,000
($1,000,000 minus $480,000).
Step Three: The $520,000 value of the common stock from step two is
fully allocated to the 750 shares of family-held common stock.
Step Four: Since A did not receive any consideration for the common
stock, the only adjustment applicable in step four is for minority discounts
or other similar discounts.1s5
E. Treatment of Debt Under Section 2701
Debt,'" as it is defined in section 2701,"' does not constitute an
178. See supra note 124.
179. Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-2 (1992); see also supra note 117.
180. See HAMILTON,supra note 17, at 251-274. A cumulative dividend right requires that the
corporation catch up on any unpaid dividends accrued from prior years before making any other
dividend distributions to other classes of stock.
181. See supra note 121 and accompanying text for a discussion of qualified payment rights.
182. The valuation takes into account A's voting rights, but disregards A's put right.
183. The fair market value would include a factor to reflect the control A has on Corporation
X. See supra note 167 for a discussion of minority shareholders and control of a corporation.
184. Six hundred preferred shares multiplied by $800, the assumed per share fair market value
in step one. Under § 2701(a)(3)(B), the put is treated as if exercised in s way resulting in the lowest
value.
185. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. A minority discount would not be appropriate
in this example because A has voting control over Corporation X.
186. In Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 402 (2d Cir. 1957), the court defined debt
as an unqualified obligation to pay a sum certain, at a reasonably close fixed maturity date along
with a fixed percentage in interest, payable regardless of the corporation's income or loss.
187. Debt presents a planning opportunity to avoid falling within § 2701. By substituting debt
for preferred stock in the estate freeze recapitalization, the older generation shareholder can receive
similar cash flow in the form of interest and principal payments. A holder of debt, however, cannot
exert voting control over the corporation. Thus, by using debt, the older generation sacrifices voting
control. Voting control was an important right associated with the preferred stock used in the typical
estate freeze recapitalization.
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applicable retained interest." Rather, an applicable retained interest must be
an equity interest.'19  Consider what happens, however, if the I.R.S.
recharacterizes debt as equity: the debt would fall within the definition of
an applicable retained interest 9' and would, therefore, be subject to the gift
tax provisions of section 2701. To complicate matters, the I.R.S. has refused
to issue advance rulings on whether it would treat debt in a proposed transaction
as equity." Thus, in planning for family-owned corporate transactions, the
possibility that debt will be recharacterized as equity and thereby pull the
transaction within the broad scope of section 27011" is a possibility that is
worthy of consideration.
IV. Is IT DEBT OR Is IT EQUrrY?
The recharacterization of debt as equity, in some situations, will lead to an
unforeseen gift tax under section 2701. 1' The manner in which the courts and
Congress have treated the debt-equity issuel" must, therefore, be considered.
Generally, the shareholder assumes the risks associated with the business and
reaps profits if the business succeeds. " On the other hand, a creditor does
not share in the profits of the business, but rather receives his compensation
independent of any risks associated with the business and has a right to the
return of his capital." 7
In 1946, the Supreme Court addressed the debt-equity issue in John Kelley
188. See supra note 117 for a discussion of applicable retained interests.
189. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
190. See infra notes 194-217 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 117 and accompanyingtext for a discussion of applicable retained interests.
Once the debt is recharacterized as equity, the interest payments would be distribution rights as
defined in § 2701 and the corresponding regulations. If the debt has any payment preferences, these
may fall within the scope of extraordinary payment rights.
192. Rev. Proc. 91-3, C.B. 314.
193. See infra notes 218-48 and accompanying text for examples.
194. Tress. Reg. § 25.2701 (1992). The recharacterization of debt to equity would not
automatically result in a transfer tax. The other aspects of § 2701 discussed supra at notes 99-136
would also need to be present. See also infra notes 218-48 and accompanying text for examples.
195. The tax treatment of debt and equity is a central issue in the pattern of corporate taxation.
A corporation can deduct interest payments pursuant to § 163, while dividends are not deductible
by the corporation. Westin v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 797, 805 (1987) held that if
advances from an investor to a corporation are considered capital contributions the investor may not
subsequently claim a bad debt deduction. For additional tax treatment differences see generally
BORIS I. BFrKER & JAMES S. EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHARIOLDERS (4th ed. 1979).
196. Commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1935).
197. Id.
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Co. v. Commissioner. ' In Kelley, the Court emphasized the fact that a
substantial amount of capital had been invested into the stock of the corporation
so that the corporation would not be thinly capitalized. The Court then stated,
"as material amounts were invested in stock, we need not consider the effects
of extreme situations such as normal stock investment and obviously excessive
debt structure. " 99 This observation has led some lower courts to consider the
ratio between debt and equity as the determinative factor in distinguishing
between the two forms of corporate investment.'
The courts subsequently began to use multiple factors2l' to distinguish a
198. 326 U.S. 521 (1946). The investment in question involved an eight percent noncumulative
interest that was to be paid if earnings were sufficient. The investment had a twenty year maturity,
and was subordinate to all creditors, but had priority over stockholders, and could not participate
in management.
199. Id. at 526.
200. E.g., Rowan v. United States, 219 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1955); Dobkin v. Commissioner, 15
T.C. 31 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 192 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1951).
201. Some of the factors the courts have considered as they weighed the debt versus equity
issue:
Byerlite Corp. v. Williams, 286 F.2d 285, 290 (6th Cir. 1960); Litton Business Systems, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 367, 376-77 (1973) (reporting the manner in which the parties to the
transaction reported the advances on their books may be indicative of whether the parties intended
to treat the transaction as debt or equity); Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 697-
98 (3d Cir. 1968) (stating identity of interest-the court considered the identity of interest between
the transfer of funds and the shareholders); Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 402
(5th Cir. 1972); Wood Preserving Corp. of Baltimore v. United States, 347 F.2d 117, 119-20 (4th
Cir. 1967) (defining use of funds-to meet daily operating expenditures of the corporation, rather
than capital assets, would indicate the likelihood of a loan); Byerlite v. Williams, 286 F.2d 285, 291
(6th Cir. 1960) (defining length of transaction terms-the length of the transaction is important, i.e.,
the longer the period over which advances and repayments are made the more it looks like equity);
Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 410-11 (5th Cir. 1972); Gooding Amusement Co.
v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159, 165-66 (6th Cir. 1956) (defining repayments-actual repayments
of the advances pursuant to the terms of the transactions indicate debt); Roth Steel Tube Co. v.
Commissioner, 800 F.2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1986); Bauer v. Commissioner, 748 F.2d 1365, 1368-
70 (9th Cir. 1984); Post Corp. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1296, 1307-08 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (defining
debt to equity ratio-the higher the ratio of debt to equity within the corporation's capital structure
(commonly referred to as thin capitalization) the more likely the advances were equity; thin
capitalization is a strong indication that advances are capital contributions rather than equity); A.R.
Lantz Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1970); Wood Preserving Corp. of
Baltimore v. United States, 347 F.2d 117, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1967) (pledging security-security
provided for the repayment of the advances is indicative of debt); In re Lane v. United States, 742
F.2d 1311, 1317-18 (11th Cir. 1984); C.M. Gooch Lumber Sales Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.
649, 659 (1968) (defining ability to repay-the corporation's ability to repay the advances without
relying on profits is indicative of debt. If the expectation of repayment depends solely on the
success of the borrower's business, the transaction has the appearance of a capital contribution. An
expectation of repayment solely from corporate earnings is not indicative of bona fide indebtedness
regardless of its reasonableness); In re Lane v. United States, 742 F.2d 1311, 1317-18 (11th Cir.
1984); Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 625, 632 (6th Cir. 1986) (defining sinking
fund-the establishment of a sinking fund is indicative of debt); Stinnett's Pontiac Service Inc. v.
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corporation's obligation to repay from an equity investment. Section 385m
was enacted in 1969 as an attempt to establish uniform rules to define debt and
equity.' The statute" authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to issue
regulations governing the classification of debt and equity and provided
guidelines to be considered in the regulations.' Regulations were issued in
1980, but were subsequently withdrawn in 1983." Thus, case law17
remains the primary guide for an inquiry into the debt-equity issue.2
In determining whether advances of funds to an individual corporation are
considered a capital contribution or debt, the courts have expanded upon the five
Commissioner, 730 F.2d 634, 640 (11th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 178, 180
(6th Cir. 1966); Georgia Pacific Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 790,797-98 (1975) (stating ability
to obtain outside financing-the corporation's ability to obtain financing from an independent outside
lender is indicative of debt. Where no reasonable creditor would have acted in the same manner
there is strong evidence that the transaction is a capital contribution); Stinnett's Pontiac Service Inc.
v. Commissioner, 730 F.2d 634, 640 (1 1th Cir. 1984); Dixie Dairies Corp. v. Commissioner, 74
T.C. 476, 496 (1980) (defining provision to pay interest-where the corporation has made provisions
for the payment of interest there is indication of debt); Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, 800
F.2d 625, 631-32 (6th Cir. 1986); Stinnett's Pontiac Service Inc. v. Commissioner, 730 F.2d 634,
639 (1 th Cir. 1984); Charter Wire, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 878, 881 (7th Cir. 1962); Litton
Businesss Systems Inc.v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 367, 378 (1973) (discussing repayment
subordination-subordination of the right to repayment of the shareholder to other creditors of the
corporation is indicative of a capital contribution); In re Lane v. United States, 742 F.2d 1311, 1315
(11 th Cir. 1984); Stinnett's Pontiac Service Inc. v. Commissioner, 730 F.2d 634, 638 (1 1th Cir.
1984); Post Corp. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1296, 1304-05 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (discussing absence of
a note-the absence of a note or other instrument of indebtedness indicated a capital contribution and
not debt).
202. I.R.C. § 385 (West Supp. 1992).
203. I.R.C. § 385 (West Supp. 1992).
204. Segel v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 816, 826-27 (1987) (discussing the history of § 385 and
the issuance and withdrawal of the regulations thereunder).
205. I.R.C. § 385 (West Supp. 1992) provides five factors that could be considered in the §
385 regulations. The guidelines set out in § 385(b)(1)-(5) in full are:
(1) whether there is a written unconditional promise to pay on demand or on a specified
date a sum certain in money in return for an adequate consideration in money or
money's worth, and to pay a fixed rate of interest;
(2) whether there is subordination to or preference over any indebtedness of the
corporation;
(3) the ratio of debt to equity of the corporation;
(4) whether there is convertibility into the stock of the corporation, and
(5) the relationship between holdings of stock in the corporation and holdings of the
interest in question.
206. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1 to 1.385-12, 45 Fed. Reg. 18957 (1980) (proposed Mar.
24, 1980), revised, 45 Fed. Reg. 18957 (1980), revised and reported as Prop. Tress. Reg. §§ 1.385-
0 to 1.385-8, 47 Fed. Reg. 164 (1982), withdrawn, 48 Fed. Reg. 31053-54 (1983).
207. See supra note 201 for a summary of factors considered by the courts.
208. Segel v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 816 (1987) (discussing the history of § 385 and the
issuance and withdrawal of the regulations thereunder, which were withdrawn in 1983).
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factors listed in section 385.' The factors considered by the courtsP'* can
be broken down into four broad, yet, interrelated standards: 1) the intent of the
parties; 2) the formal characteristics of the debt; 3) the economic realities of the
transaction; and 4) the business purposes of the transaction. Each factor must
be considered based on the circumstances in each case. 211 No one factor,
moreover, is decisive, nor can it be weighed more heavily than the others in
determining whether the character of an advance is debt or equity.2 12 The
factors discussed infra are used by the courts in answering the ultimately
determinative questions: was there a genuine intention to create debt,213 with
a reasonable expectation of repayment, 214 and did that intention conform with
the economic reality of creating a debtor-creditor relationship? 23 In weighing
the numerous factors, the court will not elevate the form of a transaction over
its substance. 2 16  Thus, all the formalities may point to the treatment of
advances as debt, but the court, nonetheless, may find that the advance is equity
if the reality of the transaction weighs against treating it as indebtedness. 2
17
V. IMPACT OF CURRENT STATUTES ON CERTAIN BusiNEss TRANSACTIONS
A. Impact of Section 2701 on a Stock Redemption.
Section 2701 applies to stock redemptions18 and other changes to the
capital structure of a corporation, 211 provided that the transaction meets all of
the other provisions of section 2701. The following is an example that
illustrates the impact of section 2701 on a stock redemption.
Assume that a business that is worth $4,000,000 is owned by parents who
wish to retire and let their children take over control of the company. The
parents, however, need to sell the company to fund their retirement. One route
that they could take is a corporate redemption of their stock. Further, assume
that the children of the parents do not have the necessary funds to buy all of the
209. See supra note 201 for a summary of factors considered by the courts.
210. See supra note 201 for a summary of factors considered by the courts.
211. Dixie Dairies Corp. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 476, 493 (1980).
212. John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 530 (1946); Roth Steel Tube Co. v.
Commissioner, 800 F.2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1986).
213. Lundgren v. Commissioner, 376 F.2d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 1967).
214. See supra note 201.
215. Byerlite Corp. v. Williams, 286 F.2d 285, 290-91 (6th Cir. 1960).
216. Id.
217. Dixie Dairies Corp. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 476 (1980).
218. I.R.C. § 2701(e)(5) (West Supp. 1992). The term redemption is defined in § 317(b) s
a corporation's acquisition of its own stock from a shareholder in exchange for property.
219. Id.
220. See supra notes 99-136 and accompanying text for a discussion of § 2701's equivalents.
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stock from the parents, so the children buy only five percent of the stock. The
corporation buys the other ninety-five percent. Assume that the children and the
corporation each pay fair market value.
The corporation does not have the $3,800,000 in cash necessary to pay
for the stock, so it gives the parents an installment note at a fair market interest
rate as payment for the redemption of the parent's stock. This appears to be a
very straightforward transaction without any gimmicks, freezes, or tax avoidance
motivations. Indeed, the parents are not trying to retain control while
transferring future appreciation to the children. Rather, the parents are merely
selling their interests and allowing the children to run the company. Thus, the
children can make the company grow and appreciate in value; ideally, any
appreciation should belong to them.
As clean as this transaction appears to be, it may fall into the web of
section 2701. Debt does not constitute an applicable retained interest, m which
is necessary in order to find that a section 2701 transfer' 2 has occurred.
Applicable retained interests must be equity interests. 2  However, the debt
versus equity rules22 may recharacterize the debt in this example as
equity. 2? In this situation, the debt is unusually large in relation to the total
value of the corporation. Thus, the debt alone could trigger the
recharacterization.m In general, if the debt has equity-like characteristics, the
debt is in danger of being recharacterized as equity.' Furthermore, the IRS
will refuse to rule on whether the debt in a proposed transaction is really
equity.?
If the debt, as in this example, is recharacterized as equity, it will likely be
treated as preferred stock. Under section 2701, whenever a senior family
member transfers common stock to a junior family member-even if it is
transferred for full market value-the value of the common stock is treated as a
gift.' Since the value of the gift is determined by the subtraction method 3'
221. $4,000,000 multiplied by 95 %.
222. See supra note 117 for a definition of retained interest.
223. See supra note 110 for a discussion of transfers subject to § 2701.
224. See supra note 117 for a discussion of retained interests.
225. See supra notes 186-193 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 194-217 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 201 for a list of factors courts use to distinguish debt from equity, one of
which relates to the debt to equity ratio.
228. See supra note 201 for characteristics that courts have found to be equity-like
characteristics.
229. The IRS announced in Rev. Proc. 91-3 that it will no longer issue rulings on whether debt
is equity.
230. See supra notes 110-125 and accompanying text.
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(the value of the preferred is subtracted from the total value of the entity), the
value of the gift depends upon the value ascribed to the preferred stock by
section 2701. Section 2701 values the preferred stock as zero unless it carries
a qualified payment right and the qualified payments are actually made. I
It is likely that the installment note is a qualified payment.'m  The
installment note has a periodic payment determined at a fixed rate. 234- Because
it is a qualified payment, it will not automatically be valued at zero.m The
value of the installment note (the retained interest in this example) will depend
on its investment value.2 ' If the note does not carry a market rate of interest,
the note is likely to be valued at a discounted amount, because it does not have
good investment value."' To the extent that the note is discounted, the value
of the gift increases. For the purposes of section 2701, the installment note,
characterized as preferred stock, itself is not subject to special valuation rules.
The distribution right (the interest payment) is what affects the value of the
transferred interest.
Even if the corporation can meet the payments and the debt sustains full
value under scrutiny, the ten percent minimum value rule23' would result in
a taxable gift. 9 This would be true even though the dividends were qualified
payments, the distribution rights held their full value of $3,800,000, and the
children paid fair market value for the common stock. The result is an
unexpected taxable gift, even though no gift was intended to be made.
B. New Business Start-Up
Another disturbing impact of section 2701 can be seen in a common
business start-up scenario. If the children--who own one hundred percent of the
common stock of a new corporation--ask their parents for a loan, the parents
have the same potential problems as in the redemption situation previously
discussed.' The regulations in section 2701 treat a contribution to capital,
whether to an existing entity or to a new start-up entity," as a transfer if the
transferor, or other family members, receive an applicable retained interest or,
231. See supra notes 140-171 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 121 and accompanying text for a definition of a qualified payment right.
233. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
235. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1992).
236. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 172-75 and accompanying text.
239. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1992); Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-3(c) (1992).
240. See supra notes 218-39 and accompanying text.
241. Tress. Reg. § 25.2701-1(b)(2)(i) (1992).
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immediately after the transfer, hold an applicable retained interest in the
entity. 2 For purposes of a contribution to capital, it does not matter whether
the interests held by the transferor and transferee before and after the transaction
are substantially identical.2  With respect to other capital transactions,
however, the substantially identical before and after rule would cause this
subsection to not apply.
Assume, for example, that the children capitalize the business with
$200,000 for one hundred percent of the common stock of the new corporation.
Then, rather than going to a bank, the children borrow $3,800,000 from their
parents at the prevailing market rate of interest under terms calling for
repayment of the principal over fifteen years. Just as in the redemption example
previously discussed," if the debt in our example is recharacterized as
equity,' 0 it will probably be treated as preferred stock. Even if the
corporation can meet the payments and the debt sustains a full value under
scrutiny, the ten percent minimum value rule2" would cause a reportable
gift. 7  This would be true even though the dividends were qualified
payments, the distribution rights held their full value of $3,800,000, and the
children paid fair market value for the common stock at incorporation.' " The
result is an unexpected taxable gift where no gift was intended to be made.
C. The Problem With Section 2701
Congress intended section 2701 to provide a well-defined and administrable
set of rules, which would allow those business owners who are not abusing the
transfer tax system to freely exchange business interests in standard intrafamily
transactions, without being subject to severe transfer tax consequences while, at
242. See supra note 117 for a definition of retained interests.
243. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 218-39 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
247. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1992); Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-3(c) (1992).
248. I.R.C. § 6501(c) (West Supp. 1992). The statute of limitations is unlimited with respect
to any Chapter 14 gift unless:
1. The gift is shown on a gift tax return, or
2. If not shown as a gift, it is disclosed in such a return in a manner adequate to apprise
the IRS of the nature of the item.
In addition to the gift tax unlimited statute of limitations under Chapter 14, there also is the
case of Estate of Frederick R. Smith, 94 T.C. 872 (1990). The court in Smith held that there is no
time limit on the right of the IRS to revalue prior taxable gifts in computing adjusted taxable gifts
for federal estate tax purposes. Id. at 878. In other words, even if the taxpayer files a gift tax
return and pays some gift tax, while he may be safe from gift tax challenge after three years, the
taxpayer is never safe from federal estate tax challenge with respect to the value of the gift reported
on that gift tax return.
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the same time, deterring abusive transactions in the transfer tax system.2 9
The result-as illustrated in previous examples2 -appears to be that section
2701, coupled with the power of the IRS to recharacterize debt as equity, has
added uncertainty to several common transactions between stockholders and their
closely held corporations.
Unless changes are made to section 2701, the capital structure of closely
held businesses must be carefully scrutinized to determine whether debt may be
recharacterized as equity, thereby creating unintended taxable gifts. This cloud
of uncertainty may inhibit business formations and force family members to
obtain financing from outside third parties rather than other family members.
Furthermore, the potential chilling effect on legitimate business transactions
between a parent and child is contrary to the stated Congressional object-
ives.25
VI. PROPOSED REVISIONS
A. Safe Harbor for Debt
Section 2036(c) 2  was repealed because its application posed an
unreasonable impediment to the transfer of family businesses and caused many
taxpayers to refrain from legitimate intrafamily transactions.'5 3 One objective
of section 2701 is to allow business owners who are not abusing the transfer tax
system to exchange their business interests in legitimate intrafamily transactions,
without subjecting them to severe transfer tax consequences.'5 The
uncertainty and potentially adverse transfer tax impact that is created by the
combination of section" 2701 with the debt-equity issue, 255 contrary to the
objectives behind section 2701,' will likely inhibit legitimate intrafamily
business transactions.
To achieve the stated legislative intent,2 7 a safe harbor' should be
provided in section 2701 for legitimate intrafamily transactions that use debt, but
249. SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at S15680-1.
250. See supra notes 218-248 and accompanying text.
251. SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at S15680.
252. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
253. SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at S15680; Burke, supra note 24, at 69.
254. SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at S15680; Burke, supra note 24, at 69.
255. See supra notes 186-193 and accompanying text for discussion of the debt-equity issue.
256. SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at S15680; Burke, supra note 24, at 69.
257. SENATE RE'ORT, supra note 25, at S 15680; Burke, supra note 24, at 69.
258. Transactions falling within specific guidelines are excluded from the scope of the general
statute. This is commonly referred to as a safe harbor. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1336 (6th ed.
1990).
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fall within the combined scope of section 2701 and the debt-equity rules. 9
Section 2036(c), the predecessor to section 2701, provided a safe harbor for
qualifying debt.' The legislative history behind the safe harbor for qualified
debt provision indicates that the exception may be appropriate, since qualified
debt is easily valued, provides limited opportunities for disguised wealth
transfers," and does not constitute retained enjoyment of the enterprise.'
The rationale expressed by Congress toward debt is still applicable to
transactions under section 2701. In the absence of a safe harbor for qualified
debt provision in section 2701, business owners may restrict legitimate
intrafamily transactions due to the uncertainties of the potentially adverse tax
consequences. To achieve the legislative intent of section 2701,' and allow
for legitimate intrafamily transactions that do not abuse the transfer tax system,
a statutorily qualified debt safe harbor provision similar to the repealed section
2036(c)(7)(C) 2" should be added to section 2701.
259. See supra notes 186-193 and accompanying text.
260. Burke, supra note 24, at 111-116 for an analysis of the qualified debt safe harbor under
§ 2036(c)(7)(C). Section 2036 (c)(7)(c), supra note 4, defined qualified debt as:
The term "qualified debt" means any indebtedness if:
(i) such indebtedness-
(I) unconditionally requires the payment of a sum certain in money in 1 or
more fixed payments on specified dates, and
(H) has a fixed maturity date not more than 15 years from the date of issue
(or, in the case of indebtedness secured by real property, not more than 30
years from the date of issue).
(ii) the only other amount payable under such indebtedness is interest determined at-
(I) a fixed rate, or
(II) a rate which bears a fixed relationship to a specified market interest
rate,
(iii) the interest payment dates are fixed,
(iv) such indebtedness is not by its terms subordinated to the claims of general creditors,
(v) except in a case where such indebtedness is in default as to interest or principal, such
indebtedness does not grant voting rights to the person to whom the debt is owed or
place any limitation on the exercise of voting rights by others, and
(vi) such indebtedness-
([) is not (directly or indirectly) convertible into an interest in the enterprise
which would not be qualified debt, and
(!U) does not otherwise grant any right to acquire such an interest.
The requirement of clause (i)(1) that the principal be payable on 1 or more specified dates and the
requirement of clause (i)(H) shall not apply to indebtedness payable on demand if such indebtedness
is issued in return for cash to be used to meet normal business needs of the enterprise.
261. I.R.C. § 7872 (West Supp. 1992), generally requires below-market interest rates to be
imputed at prevailing rates among the parties who are then taxed as if market interest was charged
and paid.
262. See Burke, supra note 24, at 112; S. REP. No. 445, 526-29, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5028-31.
263. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 260.
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B. Safe Harbor for Start-Up Debt
Presumably, in the case of start-up debt, an appreciation in the value of a
business will result chiefly from the efforts of the younger generation
shareholder.' Therefore, no transfer or gift occurs when a parent makes a
legitimate loan to a child's start-up business. Under the repealed section
2036(c), a separate safe harbor existed for this start-up debt. 6 Even though
section 2701 does not specifically include start-up debt, the Treasury added this
interpretation when it promulgated the regulations' for section 2701.
Contrary to the stated objectives for section 2701,' without a safe harbor
for start-up debt in section 2701, younger generation shareholders may be
inhibited from legitimately borrowing funds from family members for business
start-ups. Therefore, Congress should carve out a safe harbor for start-up debt
in section 2701 similar to the repealed I.R.C. section 2036(c)(7)(D).3
VII. CONCLUSION
Section 2701 is complex and seems to impact certain transactions that
appear to be beyond the legislature's intent. 2' An understanding of section
265. CQr S. REP. No. 445, supra note 262, at 528, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5038-
39.
266. See generally Burke, supra note 24, at 114-115 (for an analysis of the qualified start-up
debt safe harbor under former § 2036(c)(7)(D)).
267. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
269. Section 2036(c)(7)(D) (1988) (supra note 4) defined qualified start-up debt as:
(ii)(1) such indebtedness unconditionally requires the payment of a sum certain in
money,
(1l) such indebtedness was received in exchange for cash to be used in any
enterprise involving the active conduct of a trade or business,
(II) the person to whom the indebtedness is owed has not at any time
(whether before, on, or after the exchange referred to in subclause ())
transferred any property (including goodwill) which was not cash to the
enterprise or transferred customers or other business opportunities to the
enterprise,
(IV) the person to whom the indebtedness is owed has not at any time
(whether before, on, or after the exchange referred to in subclause (11)) held
any interest in the enterprise (including an interest as an officer, director,
or employee) which was not qualified start-up debt,
(V) any person who (but for subparagraph (A)(i) would have been an
original transferee (as defined in paragraph (4)(C)) participates in the active
management (as defined in section 2032A (e)(12)) of the enterprise, and
(VI) such indebtedness meets the requirements of clauses (v) and (vi) of
subparagraph (C).
270. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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2701 is imperative not only for the estate planning practitioner, but for all
attorneys who handle corporate formations or advise family owned corporations
issuing debt or capital among family members. Section 2701 is so broad that
many routine transactions, such as the redemption of a corporation's stock or the
formation of a new business,"' could become ensnared in its provisions.
Transactions that use debt rather than equity may find themselves within the
scope of section 2701, if the debt is recharacterized as equity.' The
transactions ensnared in the web of the new statutes will be treated as preferred
stock recapitalizations, thereby creating unexpected gift or estate taxes. Thus,
the impact of these statutes must be understood not just from an estate planning
standpoint, but also from a general business planning perspective.
Unless Congress enacts statutory revisions that provide safe harbor
exceptions for qualified debt and qualified start-up debt, similar to those
provided under the repealed section 2036(c), family business transactions will
continue to be clouded in uncertainty. Business owners will continue to be
confused as to whether they are inadvertently providing taxable gifts to their
children. Hopefully, Congress will provide additional guidance to family
business owners to avert the chilling effect of section 2701 on legitimate
business transactions between family members.
271. See supra notes 218-41 (discussing the transfers covered by § 2701).
272. See supra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX B
Steps to Determine Whether
Section 2701 Applies
Step 1. Is the transaction a transfer?'
*contribution to capital
*redemption
*recapitalization
*other change in capital
If not, then section 2701 is inapplicable.
Step 2. If the transaction is a transfer (Step 1), does the transferor or
applicable family member 4  receive an applicable retained
interest?"5
If not, then section 2701 is inapplicable.
Step 3. If the transferor or applicable family member receives an applicable
retained interest (Step 2), are the interests held before and after the
transaction substantially identical? 6
If so, then section 2701 is inapplicable.
Step 4. If the interests are not substantially identical (Step 3), is the interest
one for which there are market quotations from established securities
markets?"
If so, then section 2701 is inapplicable.
Step 5. If market quotations from. established securities markets are
unavailable (Step 4), is the new interest the same class as the
transferred interest?2'
If so, then section 2701 is inapplicable.
2a
273. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX A
Example of Preferred Stock Recapitalization
Prior to Sections 2036(c) and 2701
Assume that a parent owns 100 percent of the common stock of Z Corporation,
valued at $10,000,000.
Step 1. The parent recapitalizes the equity into:
*Common stock worth $1,000,000
*Preferred stock worth $9,000,000, with an eight percent non-
cumulative dividend.
Step 2. The parent gifts common stock to the child and keeps the preferred
stock. The parent then pays the gift tax on $1,000,000.
Assume that ten years later the business is worth $20,000,000. The
parent then owns preferred stock worth $9,000,000. The child owns
common stock worth $11,000,000.
Step 3. When the parent dies, the parent's estate pays tax on $9,000,000, the
value of his preferred stock. In step two, the parent paid gift tax on
$1,000,000. Therefore, total transfer taxes are paid on $10,000,000.
Step 4. Without the recapitalization and gift tax, the parent's estate would pay
tax on the full value of the corporation at his death of $20,000,000.
Step 5. Transfer tax savings:
Corporate Value at Death ................ $20,000,000
Tax Paid on ....................... $10,000,000
Savings: equal to the transfer tax on ......... $10,000,000
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Step 6. If the new interest is not the same class as the transferred interest (Step
5), is the new interest proportionally the same as the transferred
interest? "
If so, then section 2701 is inapplicable.
Step 7. If the new interest is not proportionally the same as the transferred
interest (Step 6), then section 2701 applies, and the interest must be
valued according to section 2701.
279. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX C
Section 2701 Valuation of Retained Interest
Step 1. Is the interest a qualified payment right?'
If not, the value of the right is zero (value of retained interest is
zero)2s1
Step 2. If the interest is a qualified payment right (Step 1), does it have any
of the following rights:
*Liquidation Right
*Put
*Call
*Conversion Right'
Step 3. If the qualified payment right does contain any of these rights (Step 2),
the value of the retained interest is computed as if the right is exercised
in a manner resulting in the lowest value for all rights.'
If the qualified payment right does not contain any of these rights (Step
2), the value of the retained interest is based on the fair market
value."'
Step 4. The value of the gift using the subtraction method?5 is then
determined using the value of the retained interest determined in Step
1 or Step 3.
a. Determine the fair market value of the family-held equity interest
after the transfer.'
b. Subtract from the value of the family held-equity interest after the
transfer (Step 4a) the value of the retained interest determined in
Step 1 or Step 3 above.'
280. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 161-165 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 141, 149 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
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c. Allocate the remaining value to the transferred interests, junior
equity (usually the common stock).'
d. Reduce the Step 4c amount by any discounts.'
The minimum value of a junior interest is ten percent of all equity interests in
the entity plus the total indebtedness of the entity to the transferor or applicable
family member. '
Reinhold Schroeder
288. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
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